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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION
OF ABORTION
Michael R. Braudest
INTRODUCTION

I.

Among the most divisive legal and social issues in contemporary
American society is the existence of a woman's right to obtain an
abortion, as counterbalanced by the authority of states and municipalities to regulate and restrict that right. Between 1973 and 1989,
the basic rules concerning the power of the states to prohibit or
significantly restrict the performance of abortions were those announced by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. I While the rules and
analytic method adopted in Roe quickly became controversial, they
nevertheless provided relatively clear guidance to women seeking
abortions and to physicians willing to perform the procedure. Sixteen
years after Roe, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,2 the
Supreme Court, substantially altered by retirements and new appointments, served notice that the analytical basis of Roe is no longer
acceptable to a majority of the Justices. It is a safe prediction that
Roe will not long survive in its original form. 3
The purpose of this Article is to explore in detail under the
constitutions of the various states the regulation of abortion, a body
of law that is already important and will become far more important
if Roe is overruled or substantially modified. The Article begins with
a description of the major developments in abortion-related issues
decided by the Supreme Court during the period between Roe and
Webster. The decisions of state courts recognizing some form of a

t

B.A., 1975, Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1978, University of Chicago
School of Law; Assistant Public Defender, Appellate Division, Office of the
Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
3. For an interesting discussion on the political backlash following the Webster
decision, see L. TRIBE, ABORTION THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 177-97 (1990).
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"right to abortion" under the states' constitutions are then examined.
Many of these decisions have involved the question whether states
should provide funding and facilities which permit economically disadvantaged women to obtain abortions. The discussion then focuses
on another major battleground in the abortion controversy which has
led to state constitutional adjudication: the collision between the
right of anti-abortion demonstrators to publicly express their views
and the right of abortion clinics to be free from interference by such
demonstrators. The discussion concludes with an examination of
Maryland's newly adopted statutory scheme regulating abortion.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
In Roe v. Wade, a pregnant woman brought a class action suit
challenging the validity of Texas's criminal abortion law. 4 That law
prohibited the procurement of an abortion at any stage of pregnancy
except for the purpose of saving the life of the potential mother. 5
4. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191-1194, 1196 (Vernon 1961). These statutes read
as follows:
Article 1191. Abortion. If any person shall designedly administer to
a pregnant woman or knowingly procure to be administered with her
consent any drug or medicine, or shall use towards her any violence
or means whatever externally or internally applied, and thereby procure
an abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two
nor more than five years; if it be done without her consent, the
punishment shall be doubled. By "abortion" is meant that the life of
the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or that
a premature birth thereof be caused.
Article 1192. Furnishing the means. Whoever furnishes the means
for procuring an abortion knowing the purpose intended is guilty as
an accomplice.
Article 1193. Attempt at abortion. If the means used shall fail
to produce an abortion, the offender is nevertheless guilty of an
attempt to produce abortion, provided it be shown that such means
were calculated to produce that result, and shall be fined not less
than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.
Article 1194. Murder in producing abortion. If the death of the
mother is occasioned by an abortion so produced or by an attempt
to effect the same it is murder.
Article 1196. By medical advice. Nothing in this chapter applies
to an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the
purpose of saving the life of the mother.
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 118.
5. There exists a tendency among persons with strong opinions concerning the
morality of abortion to attach significance to the label used to denominate a
woman considering an abortion. The so-called "pro-life" faction finds it
offensive to refer to this individual as "the woman," while calling her "the
mother" is at times viewed as offensive to the so-called "pro-choice" faction.
The purpose of this Article is to explore the law without offering any moral
judgment. In an effort to maintain neutrality, the appellation "potential
mother" shall be used herein.

1990]

State Regulation of Abortion

499

The Court held that this statute violated the plaintiff's right to due
process of law. The Court's method of analysis was to identify three
important conflicting interests, to balance those interests against each
other, and to determine at what point during the course of a pregnancy
each interest becomes paramount. 6
Identifying in constitutional terms the interest of the potential
mother, the Court found a "right of privacy" in the "Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action."7 Closely tied to the privacy right of the potential mother was
the necessity that her physician be permitted the freedom to exercise
his or her best medical judgment. The Court reasoned that proper
medical judgment could under some circumstances take the form of
aiding a potential mother in deciding whether to have an abortion.
The Court also identified two important governmental interests
which could corne into conflict with the potential mother's right to
decide whether and when to undergo an abortion. First, the Court
recognized an interest in safeguarding the potential mother's health
which permits the state to enact regulations aimed at promoting health
and maintaining appropriate medical standards. That interest does
not, however, become constitutionally compelling until approximately
the end of the first trimester of pregnancy. During the first trimester,
the decision of potential mother and physician is immunized from
governmental interference. 8
Second, the Court recognized a governmental interest in the
potentiality of human life. That interest was found to become compelling at the point of viability-that is, when the fetus "has the

6. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164, 165.
7. Id. at 153. The Court found support for this right of privacy in a series of
earlier cases dealing with contraception and other aspects of family life. See,
e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (ban on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried adults violative of guarantee of equal protection under
the fourteenth amendment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statutory
ban on interracial marriages invalid under the fourteenth amendment); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (prohibition upon distribution of contraceptives to adults violates constitutional right of privacy within the penumbra
of the Bill of Rights); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents'
liberty interest in raising their children requires invalidation of requirement
that children be sent to public as opposed to private schools under the
fourteenth amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (prohibition
of teaching any language -other than English to any child under the eighth
grade violates the fourteenth amendment).
8. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. In a subsequent case, the Court wrote: "Frequently,
the first trimester is estimated as 12 weeks following conception, or 14 weeks
following the last menstrual period." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 431 n.15 (1983). In the same footnote, the Akron
Court retained the conclusion of its predecessors in Roe that a trimester is not
a precisely measurable period of time.
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capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb."9 That point
is generally reached between twenty-four and twenty-eight weeks into
a pregnancy. 10 At this stage, the state is free to heavily regulate
abortions, including prohibiting the procedure altogether unless it is
necessary to preserve the life of the potential mother.
During the remainder of the 1970s, the Court did not retreat
from Roe in any substantial fashion. In fact, the Court often struck
down attempts by state legislatures to place significant impediments
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. While the Court
recognized that it had not established an absolute right to abortion,
and that the states retained the freedom to regulate the procedure so
long as those regulations were not unduly burdensome, II the Justices
regularly struck down state laws which ran afoul of the basic Roe
framework.
For example, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth,12 the Court expressly reaffirmed Roe's viability analysis,
struck down an absolute requirement of spousal or parental consent,
and invalidated a prohibition upon, a commonly used technique for
performing abortions. At the same time, the Court in Danforth upheld
statutory requirements that a physician obtain written consent from
the potential mother before performing the procedure and that he
maintain certain records. The Court found that these measures were
genuinely health related and did not interfere with the opportunity
for physician and patient to consult and reach a decision.
Similarly, in Bellotti v. Baird,13 the Court held that a state may
impose a parental or judicial consent requirement on an immature
minor seeking an abortion, but only if the minor is granted an
opportunity to establish that she is sufficiently mature to make the
decision herself. In Colautti v. Franklin,t4 the Court reaffirmed Roe's
viability criterion and its emphasis on the independent role of the
physician, holding, inter alia, that certain restrictions on the physician's options when a fetus "may" be viable were void for vagueness.
In 1980, the Supreme Court dealt a substantial, if indirect, setback
to the qualified "right to abortion" it had announced in Roe. In
9. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
10. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 457
& n.5 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Hendricks, The Limits of

11.
12.
13.
14.

Life, JOHNS HOPKINS MAG., Oct. 1989, at 16 (noting that while a fetus twentytwo or fewer weeks old cannot survive because of insufficient lung capacity,
survival rates at major hospitals are increasing in the twenty-four to twentysix week range).
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) (holding that medicaid benefits
may constitutionally be withheld for elective, non therapeutic abortions).
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
443 U.S. 622 (1979).
439 U.S. 379 (1979).
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Harris v. McRae ls and its companion case, Williams v. ZbaraZ,16 the
Court considered the constitutional validity of the Hyde Amendment l7
and similar state legislation. Under the Hyde Amendment, the federal
government would no longer provide reimbursement to the states
through the medicaid program for subsidization of medically necessary
abortions. While the medicaid program would continue to subsidize
the great majority of medically necessary procedures, nearly all abortions-including some that were medically necessary-would be excluded from coverage. IS
Two issues were before the Court in Harris. The first was
statutory, and focused on whether the states were required to continue
funding abortions under the medicaid program even after federal
reimbursement had been removed. The Court examined the relevant
legislative history, and concluded that the purpose of the medicaid
program was to reduce the burden on the states through federal
assistance. The Court found that Congress had never intended for
the states to be forced to accept unilateral funding responsibility.
Rather, it was intended that the states would administer the disbursement of federal funds. Therefore, the cutoff of federal funding
effectively removed the medicaid subsidy for abortions in its entirety. 19
Having so concluded, the Court found that the constitutional
issue was squarely presented. The petitioners asserted four separate
arguments: (1) that the Hyde Amendment violated the substantive
due process right recognized in Roe by reducing a potential mother's
right to terminate her pregnancy, (2) that the legislation violated the
establishment of religion clause of the first amendment, (3) that it
15.
16.
17.
18.

448 U.S. 297 (1980).
448 U.S. 358 (1980).
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
The Harris Court described the Hyde Amendment as follows:
Since September 1976, Congress has prohibited either by an amendment to the annual appropriations bill for the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare or by a joint resolution-the use of any
federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid
program except under certain specified circumstances. This funding
restriction is commonly known as the "Hyde Amendment," after its
original congressional sponsor, Representative Hyde. The current version of the Hyde Amendment, applicable for the fiscal year 1980,
provides:
"[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be
used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would
be endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or except for such
medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest when
such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement
agency or public health service."
Harris, 448 U.S. at 302.
19. [d. at 309-11.
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interfered with the free exercise of religion, and (4) that its discrimination between medically necessary abortions and other necessary
medical procedures violated the guarantee of equal protection. 20
The Court turned first to the heart of the matter-that is, whether
the Hyde Amendment was at odds with the liberty interest recognized
in Roe. Holding that it was not, the majority borrowed heavily from
the reasoning of Maher v. Roe,21 where the Court had rejected the
less compelling contention that medicaid funding was constitutionally
required for purely elective, medically unnecessary abortions. The
majority in Harris reasoned that a state is perfectly free to make a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortions and to implement
that judgment through its allocation of funds. Similarly, the Court
noted that if the Hyde Amendment left intact an impediment to the
availability of abortions, that impediment was poverty-a condition
which the state has not caused. 22
Finding that Roe imposed no affirmative obligation on the states
to assist in the obtaining of an abortion but only a negative obligation
to refrain from unnecessary interference, the majority in Harris found
the existence of medical necessity for an abortion constitutionally
irrelevant. In effect, it reasoned that government has no obligation
to eliminate all of the consequences of indigency, but instead may
constitutionally make social policy by concentrating its resources in
areas that it finds most deserving, so long as it does not erect obstacles
to the exercise of fundamental rights. Since the Hyde Amendment

20. [d. at 311.
21. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
22. The Court adopted the following language from Maher:
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind from the
laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. The Connecticut
regulation places no obstacles-absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant
woman's path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an
abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's
decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent
on private sources for the service she desires. The State may have
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the
woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to
abortions that was not already there. The indigency that may make
it difficult-and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women
to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the
Connecticut regulation.
Harris, 448 U.S. at 314 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474). The Harris Court
went on to add: "The Hyde Amendment, like the Connecticut welfare regulation at issue in Maher, places no governmental obstacle in the path of a
woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of
unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical services, encourages alternative activity deemed in the public interest." Harris, 448 U.S. at 315.
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had erected no obstacle that was not already present, it did not violate
the due process right announced in Roe.23
The Court then proceeded to briefly analyze, and reject, the
remaining constitutional challenges. With respect to the establishment
clause, the majority concluded that the Hyde Amendment merely
coincided with the views of certain religions; it did not actively favor
one religion over another. The free exercise contention was rejected
because the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise it.24
Somewhat greater attention was devoted to the equal protection
assertion. The Court reiterated that no substantive right had been
infringed because financial need does not alone define a suspect class.
Therefore, the distinction between abortion and other medical procedures need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental
objective. That objective was ironically found in the text of Roe,
where the Court had recognized the legitimacy of the state's interest
in the potentiality of human life. 2s
The holding in Harris commanded a majority of five Justices.
Each of the four dissenting Justices filed a separate opinion, which
later proved to be influential when state courts considered similar
issues under their own constitutions. Justice Brennan concluded that
the challenged legislation was inconsistent with the right of choice
protected by Roe.26 Justice Marshall was particularly concerned with
the risk to life and health that dangerous pregnancies could impose
on women unable to afford an abortionY

23. [d. at 316-18.
24. [d. at 320-21.
25. [d. at 324-25.
26. Justice Brennan wrote in part:
The Hyde Amendment's denial of public funds for medically necessary
abortions plainly intrudes upon this constitutionally protected decision,
for both by design and in effect it serves to coerce indigent pregnant
women to bear children that they would otherwise elect not to have.
When viewed in the context of the Medicaid program to which
it is appended, it is obvious that the Hyde Amendment is nothing less
,than an attempt by Congress to circumvent the dictates of the Constitution and achieve indirectly what Roe v. Wade said it could not
do directly.
[d. at 330-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
27. Justice Marshall wrote in part:
Numerous conditions-such as cancer, rheumatic fever, diabetes, malnutrition, phlebitis, sickle cell anemia, and heart disease-substantially
increase the risks associated with pregnancy or are themselves aggravated by pregnancy. Such conditions may make an abortion medically
necessary in the judgment of a physician, but cannot be funded under
the Hyde Amendment. Further, the health risks of undergoing an
abortion increase dramatically as pregnancy becomes more advanced.
By the time a pregnancy has progressed to the point where a physician
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Justice Blackmun joined the other dissenting opinions, writing
only to express his outrage at what he perceived to be the majority's
callousness to the poor. 28 Justice Stevens, stressing Roe's holding that
the right to abortion is always protected when the life or health of
the potential mother is endangered, concluded that Congress had
abandoned the neutral principle of medical need and was simply
punishing women who needed abortions but could not afford them.
Justice Stevens would have struck down the Hyde Amendment, and
the similar state statute at issue in Zbaraz, as "an unjustifiable, and
indeed blatant violation of the sovereign's duty to govern impartially. "29
Three years after the decisions in Harris and Zbaraz, the Court,
by a vote of six to three, resoundingly reaffirmed the principles
announced ten years earlier in Roe. In Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 30 the issue presented was the validity of
five provisions of an ordinance enacted by the city of Akron, Ohio.
The ordinance in question provided the following: (1) that all abortions after the first trimester were to be performed in a hospital,
rather than in an outpatient clinic; (2) that parental consent was to
be obtained prior to the performance of an abortion upon an unmarried minor; (3) that before consent to an abortion will be deemed
"informed," a physician was required to recite a lengthy litany of
information designed to inform the potential mother that a fetus is
very close to being a human being and that an abortion is a dangerous
procedure; (4) that a twenty-four hour waiting period was required
between consent to an abortion and performance of the procedure;
and (5) that an aborted fetus had to be disposed of in a "humane
and sanitary" manner. 31
Prior to analyzing the ordinance before it, the Court deemed its
first order of business to be a forceful reaffirmation of the correctness
and continuing validity of Roe's reasoningY The Court proceeded by

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

is able to certify that it endangers the life of the mother, it is in many
cases too late to prevent her death because abortion is no longer safe.
There are also instances in which a woman's life will not be immediately threatened by carrying the pregnancy to term, but aggravation
of another medical condition will significantly shorten her life expectancy. These cases as well are not fundable under the Hyde Amendment.
[d. at 339-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[d. at 348-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
[d. at 356-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
462 U.S. 416 (1983).
[d. at 422-24.
The Akron Court posited:
[T]he doctrine of stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive
on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a
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applying the Roe holding to the Akron ordinance and found all five
of the challenged provisions to be invalid. With respect to the requirement that second trimester abortions be performed in a hospital,
the Court acknowledged the state's interest in the health of the
potential mother, but concluded that the requirement imposed substantial and unnecessary obstacles to obtaining an abortion.
The key obstacle noted by the Court was that of cost-an
abortion performed in a hospital cost $850 to $900, while an outpatient
clinic offered the same service for $350 to $400 in the same geographic
region. The Court also relied on evidence of the increasing safety of
abortions performed in clinics and the scarcity of Akron hospitals
willing to perform the procedure after the first trimester. The Court
thus concluded that the ordinance impermissibly curtailed the right
recognized in Roe. 33
The Court next turned to the requirement that a patient under
the age of fifteen provide a written waiver signed by a parent. Citing
Danforth and Bel/otti, the majority concluded that Akron's regulation
was invalid because it made no exception for the possibility that the
female minor would be sufficiently mature to make the decision for
herself. 34 Next the Court struck down the required informed consent
litany.JS The majority reasoned that such a requirement intruded on

society governed by the rule of law.
There are especially compelling reasons for adhering to stare
decisis in applying the principles of Roe v. Wade. That case was
considered with special care. It was first argued during the 1971 Term,
and reargued-with extensive briefing-the following Term. The decision was joined by The Chief Justice and six other Justices. Since
Roe was decided in January 1973, the Court repeatedly and consistently has accepted and applied the basic principle that a woman has
a fundamental right to make the highly personal choice whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy.
[d. at 419-20, 420 n.l (citations omitted).
33. [d. at 434-39.
34. [d. at 439-42.
35. That litany read as follows:
(1) That according to the best judgment of her attending physician
she is pregnant.
(2) The number of weeks elapsed from the probable time of the
conception of her unborn child, based upon the information provided
by her as to the time of her last menstrual period or after a history
and physical examination and appropriate laboratory tests.
(3) That the unborn child is a human life from the moment of
conception and that there has been described in detail the anatomical
and physiological characteristics of the particular unborn child at the
gestational point of development at which time the abortion is to be
performed, including, but not limited to, appearance, mobility, tactile
sensitivity, including pain, perception or response, brain and heart
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the function of the physician and was designed to influence the
potential mother to withhold her consent. The Court added that while
it is perfectly legitimate for a state to assure that the woman be
apprised of the risks of pregnancy and the abortion technique to be
used, there is no justification for requiring that the physician who
will perform the procedure (as opposed to some other individual) be
the person who provides the information. 36
The requirement of a twenty-four hour waiting period between
consent and performance of the procedure met a similar fate. The
Court perceived no medical benefit reSUlting from this mandate. It
emphasized the costs of two separate hospital admissions and the
possibility that facilities for the operation would be unavailable at
the end of the waiting period.3' Finally, the Court summarily invalidated the "humane disposal" of the fetus requirement, holding that
the concept of "humane" is impermissibly vague where a criminal
conviction is the result of a violation. 38
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, dissented. The dissenters disagreed with the majority on every aspect of
its analysis of the Akron ordinance, and would have found each of
the five provisions to be valid. Of greater importance, the dissent

[d.

36. [d.
37. [d.
38. [d.

function, the presence of internal organs and the presence of external
members.
(4) That her unborn child may be viable, and thus capable of
surviving outside of her womb, if more than twenty-two (22) weeks
have elapsed from the time of conception, and that her attending
physician has a legal obligation to take all reasonable steps to preserve
the life and health of her viable unborn child during the abortion.
(5) That abortion is a major surgical procedure which can result
in serious complications, including hemorrhage, perforated uterus,
infection, menstrual disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and prematurity in subsequent pregnancies; and that abortion may leave
essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing psychological problems she may have, and can result in severe emotional disturbances.
(6) That numerous public and private agencies and services are
available to provide her with birth control information, and that her
physician will provide her with a list of such agencies and the services
available if she so requests.
(7) That numerous public and private agencies and services are
available to assist her during pregnancy and after the birth of her
child, if she chooses not to have the abortion, whether she wishes to
keep her child or place him or her for adoption, and that her physician
will provide her with a list of such agencies and the services available
if she so requests.
at 423 n.S.
at 448-49.
at 450.
at 451.
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attacked Roe head-on, arguing that the entire concept of dividing a
pregnancy into stages is unsound both as a matter of scientific reality
and as a matter of sound constitutional adjudication. With respect
to Roe's legal analysis, Justice O'Connor agreed that the state has a
compelling interest in the potentiality of human life and in safeguarding maternal health. She differed from the Roe majority, however,
in her view that those "interests are present throughout pregnancy. "39
Thus, the dissenters disagreed with the notion that abortions are
constitutionally more acceptable during the first trimester than later
in pregnancy. In their view, "potential life is no less potential in the
first weeks of pregnancy than it is at viability or afterward. At any
stage in pregnancy, there is the potential for human life."40In
addition, the dissenters in Akron, citing recent medical studies, argued
strenuously that advances in medical technology had eroded the
scientific underpinnings of the Roe analysis. 41

39. Id. at 459 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
41. Justice O'Connor wrote in part:
The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with itself.
As the medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease, the
point at which the State may regulate for reasons of maternal health
is moved further forward to actual childbirth. As medical science
becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus,
the point of viability is moved further back toward conception.
Moreover, it is clear that the trimester approach violates the fundamental aspiration of judicial decisionmaking through the application
of neutral principles "sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the community and continuity over significant periods of time .... "
The Roe framework is inherently tied to the state of medical technology that exists whenever particular litigation ensues. Although
legislatures are better suited to make the necessary factual judgments
in this area, the Court's framework forces legislatures, as a matter of
constitutional law, to speculate about what constitutes "accepted
medical practice" at any given time. Without the necessary expertise
or ability, courts must then pretend to act as science review boards
and examine those legislative judgments.
The Court adheres to the Roe framework because the doctrine
of stare decisis "demands respect in a society governed by the rule
of law." Although respect for stare decisis cannot be challenged, "this
Court's considered practice [is] not to apply stare decisis as rigidly in
constitutional as in nonconstitutional cases." Although we must be
mindful of the "desirability of continuity of decision in constitutional
questions ... when convinced of former error, this Court has never
felt constrained to follow precedent. In constitutional questions, where
correction depends upon amendment and not upon legislative action
this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power to
reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions."
Even assuming that there is a fundamental right to terminate
pregnancy in some situations, there is no justification in law or logic
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The Akron dissenters ultimately obtained much of what they
wanted in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 42 By the time of
the Webster decision, Justices Kennedy and Scalia had replaced Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Powell-two members of the Roe and
Akron majorities. This change on the Court led to a combination of
viewpoints in Webster which suggests that Roe may not long survive.
Challenged in Webster was the constitutional validity of four
provisions of a Missouri statute43 which was anti-abortion in tone and
content. The statute provided the following: (1) a preamble announcing that life begins at conception and that unborn children have a
protectable interest in life, health, and well-being; (2) a prohibition
on the use of public funds and facilities for the performance of
abortions; (3) a prohibition on public funding for the counselling and
encouragement of abortions; and (4) a requirement that a physician
perform a test for viability before performing an abortion, if the
pregnancy is twenty or more weeks along. 44
The alignment of views in Webster is complex, and an overview
will be helpful before providing detailed analysis. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion of the Court and addressed all of
the issues. Joined by Justices White, Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy,
the Chief Justice found no constitutional flaw in the preamble or the
prohibition on public funding or facilities for abortions. Joined by
the entire Court, he found the challenge to the "encouraging or
counselling" of abortions to be moot. Joined by Justices White and
Kennedy to form a plurality, the Chief Justice upheld the viability
testing provision as he believed it must be construed, and used the
analysis of that issue as the basis for a thorough attack on Roe,
which fell short of a vote to overrule only because Roe was found
to be factually distinguishable. Justice O'Connor concurred, disagreeing only with the decision to discuss Roe at all. Justice Scalia believed
that the Court should overrule Roe outright. Justices Blackmun,
Marshall, Brennan and Stevens were of the view that Roe should
remain intact.
In Justice Rehnquist's majority-plurality opinion, the initial question presented was the validity of the preamble to the Missouri statute.
The Court found that the preamble simply expressed a value judgment,

for the trimester framework adopted in Roe and employed by the
Court today on the basis of stare decisis. For the reasons stated above,
that framework is clearly an unworkable means of balancing the
fundamental right and the compelling state interests that are indisputably implicated.
Id. at 458-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
42. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
43. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.205, 188.029, 188.210, 188.215 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
44. Webster, 492 U.S. at 501.
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and did not have any operative effect. The majority concluded that
unless and until Missouri somehow gave effect to the challenged
clauses, there was nothing for the Court to review. 45
The majority's analysis of the statutory prohibition on the use
of public facilities or employees in the performance of abortions
parallelled the Court's reasoning in Harris. Citing Harris, Maher, and
Poelker v. Doe,4fJ the Court held that this prohibition erected no
obstacle to the performance of abortions that would not have been
present had the state declined to provide any public health services.
Since the state has no affirmative obligation to provide for abortions
even during the first trimester and only a negative obligation to
refrain from undue interference, the Court found no constitutional
problem present. 47
It was in the course of analyzing the requirement that a physician
test for viability before performing an abortion that the Chief Justicenow expressing the views of a plurality (Justices Scalia and O'Connor
expressed their own views on this point)-took aim at Roe. The
plurality reasoned that any doubt cast on the validity of the statute
was not caused by a flaw in the statute, but rather by the flawed
reasoning of Roe. 48 That flaw was found to be inherent in the trimester
viability approach, which effectively promulgated a complex body of
regulations foreign to the appropriate province of a court. Instead,
the plurality maintained, the proper role of the Supreme Court is to
formulate and apply general rules; detailed regulations are the province
of legislatures.
Echoing Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Akron, the
Chief Justice went on to question the Roe holding that the state's
interest in the potentiality of life becomes compelling at the point of
viability. Chief Justice Rehnquist saw no reason why that interest,
like the governmental interest in maternal health, should not become
compelling from the moment of conception.
The plurality's actual holding was that Missouri's requirement of
viability testing furthered the state's interest in the potentiality of life,
a conclusion which was not directly at odds with Roe. Since Roe had
struck down a statute absolutely prohibiting abortions prior to viability, the plurality found Roe distinguishable and saw no necessity
to overrule it. 49 Instead, the Webster decision only required the Court
to modify and narrow Roe.
The separate opinions of the remaining Justices are remarkable
for their apparent bitterness and personal attack-the Justices accused
45. [d. at 506-07.
46. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
47. Webster, 492 U.S. at 407-11.
48. [d. at 517.
49. [d. at 521.
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each other of cowardice, deception, and gross misunderstanding of
the fundamentals of American government. While Justice O'Connor
limited her remarks to an unremarkable analysis of the Court's
tradition of self-restraint and its preference for not unnecessarily
breaking new constitutional ground, Justice Scalia went much further.
Writing that Justice O'Connor's call for restraint "cannot be
taken seriously, "50 Justice Scalia argued vigorously for the explicit
overruling of Roe. His contentiQn was fundamentally an institutional
one. Abortion, Justice Scalia reasoned, is a political issue. Specific
regulations should be formulated by elected officials, not life-tenured
judges who are, or should be, beyond the political process. He called
for Roe to be overruled swiftly, and implied that aborted fetuses are
in the unique position of never having a day in court or an opportunity
to convince judges to change the law. He further argued that a better
opportunity to dispatch Roe might never come along, as no state
could be expected to enact the sort of legislation that would squarely
contravene the Roe holding.51
The dissenters were equally firm in their view that Roe, which
should have been reaffirmed, was instead in desperate trouble because
the majority, without justification, had misconstrued the Missouri
statute to create an unnecessary constitutional controversy. In resolving that constitutional controversy, the dissenters believed, the majority had ignored fundamental principles recognized sixteen years
earlier in Roe. 52 Justice Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's dissenting

50. [d. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring).
51. [d. at 535-37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. Justice Blackmun wrote in pertinent part:
Today, Roe v. Wade, and the fundamental constitutional right of
women to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, survive but are
not secure. Although the Court extricates itself from this case without
making a single, even incremental, change in the law of abortion, the
plurality and Justice Scalia would overrule Roe (the first silently, the
other explicitly) and would return to the States virtually unfettered
authority to control the quintessentially intimate, personal, and Iifedirecting decision whether to carry a fetus to term. Although today,
no less than yesterday, the Constitution and the decisions of this
Court prohibit a State from enacting laws that inhibit women from
the meaningful exercise of that right, a plurality of this Court" implicitly
invites every state legislature to enact more and more restrictive
abortion regulations in order to provoke more and more test cases,
in the hope that sometime down the line the Court will return the
law of procreative freedom to the severe limitations that generally
prevailed in this country before January 22, 1973. Never in my memory
has a plurality announced a judgment of this Court that so foments
disregard for the law and for our standing decisions.
Nor in my memory has a plurality gone about its business in
such a deceptive fashion. At every level of its review, from its effort
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OpInIOn and added his belief that the Missouri statute invaded the
sphere of personal privacy in the area of contraception, which had
been safeguarded by Griswold v. Connecticut53 and its progeny.54
III.

A.

THE "RIGHT TO ABORTION" UNDER THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONS

A Response to the Supreme Court's Funding Decisions

Webster indicates that Roe may soon be overruled or substantially
modified. If the regulation of abortion is returned to the states, state
constitutions and constitutional jurisprudence will play a crucial role
in what will undoubtedly be a continuing controversy.
Immediately after the Roe decision, there was little need for state
courts to struggle with the existence, source, and contours of a
"constitutional right to abortion." That state of affairs came to an
abrupt end, however, when the Supreme Court ruled that government
funding for virtually all abortions could constitutionally be curtailed.
The holding in Harris v. McRae that medicaid funding for the
poor need not even include medically necessary abortions spurred
some state courts to find within their own constitutions a protected
interest in obtaining an abortion, and to construe rights under state
law as broad enough to compel the government to fund at least
medically necessary abortions. Some state courts and individual judges
went so far as to express the view that even elective abortions must
to read the real meaning out of the Missouri statute, to its intended
evisceration of precedents and its deafening silence about the constitutional protections that it would jettison, the plurality obscures the
portent of its analysis. With feigned restraint, the plurality announces
that its analysis leaves Roe "undisturbed," albeit "modif[ied] and
narrow[ed]." But this disclaimer is totally meaningless. The plurality
opinion is filled with winks, and nods, and knowing glances to those
who would do away with Roe explicitly, but turns a stone face to
anyone in search of what the plurality conceives as the scope of a
woman's right under the Due Process Clause to terminate a pregnancy
free from the coercive and brooding influence of the State. The simple
truth is that Roe would not survive the plurality's analysis, and that
the plurality provides no substitute for Roe's protective umbrella.
I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of the
millions of women who have lived and come of age in the 16 years
since Roe was decided. I fear for the integrity of, and public esteem
for, this Court.
'\
I dissent.
Id. at 537-38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
53. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
54. Webster, 492 U.S. at 564-66.
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be funded if the government is going to provide medical care for the
indigent in other areas.
Typical of the range of views on this issue are the three opinions
filed in Right to Choose v. Byrne. 55 At issue there was the validity
under the New Jersey Constitution of a statute which prohibited
medicaid funding of abortions unless it was necessary to save the life
of the potential mother. The statute, like the most restrictive version
of the Hyde Amendment, barred funding even for medically necessary
abortions if the potential mother's life was not at stake. A lower
court had invalidated the statute under both the state and federal
constitutions.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the statute violated
the right of pregnant women to equal protection under the New Jersey
Constitution56 insofar as it denied funding for medically necessary
abortions. The court began its analysis by noting the independence
of state courts from the holdings of the Supreme Court where rights
protected by state constitutions are involved, particularly where the
state is one of the original thirteen and its constitution predated the
federal constitution. 57
Reaching the merits, the court in Byrne analyzed the issue by
first applying the traditional equal protection framework developed
by the United States Supreme Court, and then applying the somewhat
different rules previously applied in the construction of the New
Jersey Constitution. In its traditional equal protection analysis, the
court first concluded that it was dealing with a right to procreational
choice that was fundamental under both state and federal law. 58

55. 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982).
56. "All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and
unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing, ?ond protecting property, and of pursuing and
obtaining safety and happiness." N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1.
57. Byrne, 91 N.J. at 299, 450 A.2d at 931. On this point, the court in Byrne
wrote: "Indeed, the United States Supreme Court itself has long proclaimed
that state Constitutions may provide more expansive protection of individual
liberties than the United States Constitution. In addition, this Court has
recognized that our state Constitution may provide greater protection than the
federal Constitution." [d. at 300, 450 A.2d at 932 (citations omitted).
58. The court in Byrne stated the following:
The right of privacy has been found to extend to a variety of areas,
including sexual conduct between consenting adults; the right to
sterilization; and even the right to terminate life itself. These cases
establish that "under some circumstances, an individual's personal
right to control her own body and life overrides the State's general
interest in preserving life."
In recent years, moreover, a body of law has developed in New
Jersey acknowledging a woman's right to choose whether to carry a
pregnancy to full-term or to undergo an abortion. Even before Roe
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Explicitly recognizing that "[t]he right to choose whether to have
an abortion . . . is a fundamental right· of all pregnant women, "59
the court in Byrne proceeded to weigh that right against the asserted
state interest of preserving potential life. Citing Roe and Justice
Marshall's dissent in Harris, the court rejected the views of the Harris
majority, and found that the state's interest was insufficient to uphold
the statute in question. 60
The court then went on to hold that the legislation also ran afoul
of New Jersey's equal protection analysis. Under that test, when an
"important personal right" is implicated, the state must establish a
greater "public need" than the federal cases require. Applying this
test, the court found the state's asserted interest was inadequate where
the health of the potential mother was at risk.
The majority refused, however, to extend this reasoning to elective
abortions where there is no immediate health risk. The court thus
accepted Maher and rejected Harris. It was with this conclusion that
Justice Pashman, concurring in most of the court's reasoning but
writing separately, disagreed. Justice Pashman perceived no constitutional distinction between funding for medically necessary abortions
and elective ones. He argued that forcing a woman to bear a child
against her will inflicts physical as well as psychological injury.
Further, Justice Pashman echoed the views of the Harris dissenters
that the withholding of funds coerces women to forego exercising a
fundamental right. 61
In dissent, Justice O'Hern argued that the issue of abortion is
one of national concern, and that on such issues the states should
v. Wade, this Court intimated that a woman who had contracted
rubella during her pregnancy had a right to choose whether to give
birth to a defective child or undergo an abortion. That intimation
became a reality in Berman v. Allen, in which the Court held that a
woman had a cause of action for deprivation of the right to decide
whether to bear a child with Down's Syndrome. We reaffirmed that
right last year in Schroeder v. Perkel, holding that a mother, after
giving birth to a child with cystic fibrosis, had a right to choose
whether to conceive a second child who might suffer from the same
genetic defect.
ld. at 303-04, 450 A.2d at 933-34 (citation omitted).
59. ld. at 305, 450 A.2d at 934.
60. The court wrote in pertinent part:
Concededly, the Legislature need not fund any of the costs of medically necessary procedures pertaining to pregnancy; conversely, it could
include in its Medicaid plan medically necessary abortions for which
federal reimbursement is not available .... Nor is it neutral to provide
one woman with the means to protect her life at the expense of a
fetus and to force another woman to sacrifice her health to protect a
potential life.
ld. at 306-07, 450 A.2d at 935 (footnotes omitted; citation omitted).
61. ld. at 318-33, 450 A.2d at 941-49 (Pashman, J., concurring).
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yield to the Supreme Court. On the merits, the dissent agreed with
Harris's holding that the government's obligation not to interfere
with a particular course of conduct does not impose an obligation to
actively support conduct tending in the opposite direction. 62
Other state courts have relied on different constitutional theories
to reach the same result as Byrne with respect to medically necessary
abortions. In Moe v. Secretary of Administration & Finance,63 the
controversy centered on a Massachusetts statute which limited medicaid payments for abortions to those required to prevent the death
of the potential mother. These restrictions were challenged by three
individual plaintiffs, each of whom was a pregnant woman whose
physician believed that an abortion was medically needed, but could
not certify that the procedure was necessary to prevent death. A
fourth plaintiff, a physician who provided gynecological care under
the medical assistance program, sued on behalf of both himself and
similarly situated physicians who were willing to perform abortions
not necessary to prevent imminent death. 64
After disposing of a number of technical defenses, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts reached the merits and found that
the statute contravened the guarantee of due process secured by the
Massachusetts Constitution. In reaching this decision, the court in
Moe noted that, in a series of cases, the Massachusetts courts had
recognized a constitutionally protected guarantee of privacy that went
beyond federal precedent. 6S
After summarizing the reasoning of the Harris majority, the
court in Moe rejected the Harris analysis. Recognizing that a state
may be selective in the benefits it dispenses, the court stressed that
such selectivity may not constitutionally burden a fundamental right.
Moreover, the court in Moe added that such a burden is no more
permissible because it is indirect than it would be if direct, and in
determining whether an improper burden has been imposed, a court
should be sensitive to the practical realities of the situation. 66
Turning to the statute before it, the court recognized that language couching its purpose in terms of encouraging childbirth "does
not camouflage the simple fact that the purpose, more starkly ex-

[d. at 334-35, 450 A.2d at 949-51 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
382 Mass. 629,417 N.E.2d 387 (1981).
[d. at 638, 417 N.E.2d at 393.
The court in Moe said: "In sum, we deal in this case with the application of
principles to which this court is no stranger, and in an area in which our
constitutional guarantee of due process has sometimes impelled us to go further
than the United States Supreme Court." [d. at 649, 417 N.E.2d at 399.
66. [d. at 652, 417 N.E.2d at 401 (citing Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)
(indirect interference with freedom of speech contravenes the first amendment».
62.
63.
64.
65.
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pressed, is discouraging abortion.' '67 The court found persuasive
Justice Brennan's reasoning from his dissenting opinion in Harristhat is, a statute similar to the Hyde Amendment unconstitutionally
acts to coerce indigent women into maternity, thus depriving them of
their option to choose an abortion protected by Roe.
Finding that the statute restricted a fundamental right, the court
in Moe turned next to the government's justification for this restriction-the potential for human life. The court rejected the argument
that this interest does not become compelling until the fetus is viable,
and sought guidance from its own precedents. Discussing in detail a
case in which a prison inmate wished to forego medical treatment
necessary to preserve his life,68 the court reviewed the relevant criteria
for intrusiveness of medical procedures and the integrity of the medical
profession-factors which had led the court to require the inmate to
undergo the procedure.
In the abortion context, the court in Moe found it decisive that
a woman deprived of a medically necessary abortion would be forced
against her will to carry a child for nine months, to bear it, and to
accept all of the physical and psychological consequences of having
given birth. The court in Moe found this intrusion to be constitutionally unsupportable, and as a result, ordered the funding of medically necessary abortions. 69
Chief Justice Hennessey dissented, finding that the majority had
perceived constitutional obstacles to the acceptance of abortions where
none had existed. Citing Harris, the dissent concluded that the majority was intruding on what is fundamentally a legislative determination. 70
Elements of both Moe and Byrne can be found in the Superior
Court of Connecticut's decision in Doe v. Maher. 71 At issue there
was a state regulation which restricted medicaid funding for abortions
to those procedures necessary to preserve the life of the potential
mother. In a sweeping opinion, the intermediate appellate court held
that the restriction violated the due process, equal protection, and
equal rights guarantees under the state's constitution. 72
The facts before the court warranted sympathy and may have
been given in detail to provide support for the court's decision. The

67. [d. at 654, 417 N.E.2d at 402 (quoting Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases:
A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in American Government, 66 GEO.
L.J. 1191, 1196 (1978».
68. Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979).
69. Moe, 382 Mass. at 658-59, 417 N.E.2d at 404.
70. [d. at 664, 417 N.E.2d at 406-07 (H~nnessey, C.J., dissenting).
71. 40 Conn. Supp. 394, 515 A.2d 134 (1986).
72. This holding was limited to medically necessary abortions; purely elective
procedures were not before the court.

516

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 19

plaintiff described by the court was a welfare mother who needed an
abortion to reduce the risks of a diagnostic procedure designed to
disclose the presence of cervical cancer. The class that she represented
was characterized by the court as "the poorest of the poor. "73 The
court described in dramatic detail both the living conditions and
health problems of the members of the plaintiff's class, clearly foreshadowing a result in favor of the plaintiff on the merits.
The legal analysis focused first on the statutory validity of the
challenged regulation, and resulted in a holding that the restriction
was illegal as a matter of state statutory law. Nevertheless, the court
wrote that the "real issue" in the case was the constitutional challenge-a challenge that "should be answered. "74 In providing that
answer, the court in Doe first declared its independence from the
Supreme Court's funding decisions. 75 Turning to the validity of the
restriction on abortion funding under the Connecticut Constitution,
the court found three separate violations. Discussing the right to
substantive due process, the court praised Roe, rejected Harris, and
found a fundamental right to procreative choice in the privacy guarantee of the Connecticut Constitution. 76

73. Doe, 40 Conn. Supp. at 406, 515 A.2d at 140.
74. Id. at 417-18, 515 A.2d at 146.
75. The court in Doe discussed its state's constitutional independence as follows:
The plaintiffs raise only state constitutional grounds to invalidate the
regulation. In making these determinations, the court must interpret
our state constitution independently of the United States constitution
when required by its text, history, tradition and intent. It is clear that
the federal constitution merely establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual liberties and rights. Nevertheless,
the underpinnings of any such decision must rest on independent and
adequate state grounds.
Id. at 418 n.29, 515 A.2d at 146-47 n.29 (citations omitted).
76. The court discussed the right to procreative choice in the following passage:
It is absolutely clear that the right of privacy is implicit in
Connecticut's ordered liberty. The Connecticut Supreme Court has
recognized that aspect of privacy which includes procreative choice as
a fundamental right. And more recently, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut again recognized the right of privacy in Ochs v. Borrelli.
Surely, the state constitutional right to privacy includes a woman's
guaranty of freedom of procreative choice. The decision whether or
not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster of
constitutionally protected choices. That decision holds a particularly
important place in the history of the right of privacy, a right first
explicitly recognized in an opinion holding unconstitutional a statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives . . . and most prominently vindicated in recent years in the context of contraception ... and
abortion. This is understandable, for in a field that by definition
concerns the most intimate of human activities and relationships,
decisions whether to accomplish or to prevent conception are among
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Citing Moe and the Supreme Court of California's decision in
Committee to De/end Reproductive Rights v. Myers, n the court in
Doe held that as a matter of due process, once the state began to
confer assistance for medically necessary procedures, it could not do
so in a manner which discriminated against abortions. 78 The court
also ruled for the plaintiffs under the equal protection clause and
equal rights amendment of the Connecticut Constitution. 79 With respect to traditional equal protection analysis, the court's reasoning
echoes that of the cases discussed earlier in this section-the state's
discrimination between medically necessary abortions and all other
medically necessary procedures infringes on a fundamental right to
choose an abortion, and is not justified by any compelling state
interest.
Doe was novel in its additional reliance on the Connecticut equal
rights amendment in striking down the funding restriction. Thus, the
Doe court found the funding restriction to be invalid under three
separate guarantees of the state constitution. Noting that the existence
of the Connecticut equal rights amendment lent strength to the case
for the plaintiff, the court offered three reasons why restrictions on
abortion funding discriminates against women. First, all medical
expenses necessary to restore a male to health are covered by the
program, while medically necessary abortions are denied to women
who need them. Second, all of a male's expenses relating to reproductive health and family planning are reimbursed. Third, "[s]ince
time immemorial, women's biology and ability to bear children have
been used as a basis for discrimination against them. "80

77.

78.
79.

80.

the most private and sensitive. "If the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free of
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
[d. at 425-26, 515 A.2d at 150 (citations omitted).
29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
Doe, 40 Conn. Supp. at 431-32, 515 A.2d at 153.
"No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected
to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil
or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin,
sex, or physical or mental disability." CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20. Article I, §
20 was amended in 1974 by adding the words "her" and "sex," and in 1984
by adding the phrase "or physical or mental disability." Doe, 40 Conn. Supp.
at 440-41 n.51, 515 A.2d at 158 n.51.
The Doe court went on to describe the third reason:
Since only women become pregnant, discrimination against pregnancy
by not funding abortion when it is medically necessary and when all
other medical expenses are paid by the state for both men and women
is sex oriented discrimination. "Pregnancy is a condition unique to
women, and the ability to become pregnant is a primary characteristic
of the female sex. Thus any classification which relies on pregnancy
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Somewhat different reasoning led the Supreme Court of California to a similar result in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights
v. Myers,S! where the court expressly addressed the social cons~quences
resulting from the birth of unwanted children into welfare families.
At issue in Myers was the validity of California statutory budget
provisions analogous to the Hyde Amendment. After emphasizing
that the morality of abortion was not an issue before the court, the
court proceeded to find the reasoning of Harris contrary to California
law.
Reviewing state court precedent, the court concluded that once
the state has elected to make benefits available, it bears a heavy
burden of justifying the withholding of benefits from persons choosing
to exercise a constitutional right. For example, in People v. Belous,s2
the Supreme Court of California, even before Roe, had struck down
a criminal abortion statute in part because a state constitutional right
of privacy was found to safeguard a woman's right to procreative
choice. The court in Belous also found that a therapeutic abortion is
a perfectly legitimate medical procedure. Since the funding restriction
prevented an indigent woman from undergoing that procedure, the
court in Myers found that it ran afoul of the California Constitution.
Unlike the cases previously cited, the court in Myers openly
discussed the social cost of "unwanted" children, and rejected the
state's argument that the government has a right to favor childbirth.
In addition, the court confronted the specter of an increase in the
population of indigent children, and in rejecting the state's asserted
justification, effectively made a value judgment that provisions analogous to the Hyde Amendment are socially dangerous. s3
Still another theory for reaching the same result was adopted by
the Court of Appeals of Oregon in Planned Parenthood Association
v. Department of Human Resources. 84 There, a funding restriction

81.
82.

83.
84.

as the determinative criterion is a distinction based on sex." Professor
Tribe put it well when he wrote: "If one were ... to recognize, as
the Supreme Court sometimes has, that 'the grossest discrimination
can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly
alike,' then it might be possible to discern an invidious discrimination
against women, or at least a constitutionally problematic subordination
of women, in the law's very indifference to the biological reality that
sometimes requires them, but never requires their male counterparts,
to resort to abortion procedures if they are to avoid pregnancy and
childbearing. ' ,
Doe, 40 Conn. Supp. at 444-45, 515 A.2d at 159-60 (citations omitted).
29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
915 (1970).
Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 278, 625 P.2d at 795, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 881-82.
63 Or. App. 41, 663 P.2d 1247 (1983), a/I'd, 297 Or. 562, 687 P.2d 785 (1984)
(en bane).
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similar to the Hyde Amendment was struck down as violative of the
privileges and immunities clause of the Oregon Constitution. 8s The
intermediate appellate court balanced the detriment to a cognizable
class of citizens against the state's asserted justification. The class of
citizens recognized by the court was those women for whom an
abortion is medically necessary.
The court in Planned Parenthood considered the arguments that
the funding restriction saved the government money and that the state
has a compelling interest in the potential for human life. The court
rejected both of these arguments. With respect to the fiscal argument
the court simply held that the government had failed to carry its
burden of proof, and noted that no rebuttal had been offered to the
counterargument that the expenses of childbirth and raising a child
in a welfare family far outweigh the costs of medically necessary
abortions. With regard to the potentiality for life justification, the
court found in Roe at least an equally compelling interest in national
health-an interest defeated by the administrative rule at issue. The
court, therefore, held that the funding restriction contravened the
state's constitution. 86
Recently, in In re T. W., 87 the Supreme Court of Florida recognized a right of abortion under its state's constitution. At issue in
T. W. was the validity of a state statute requiring parental consent or
a judicial substitute before a minor could obtain an abortion. Basing
its holding firmly on Florida law, the court found the statute invalid
under article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, which provides
that "every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. "88 The court held that this provision mandates a right
of privacy broader and stronger than that provided by the federal
constitution. As a result, any intrusion into personal privacy must
satisfy two tests: first, it must be justified by a compelling state
interest, and second, it must accomplish its purpose through the least
intrusive means possible. 89
Applying this analytical framework to the matter before it, the
court found that the decision whether or not to bear a child is at the
core of a constitutional right of privacy. Moreover, this constitutionally protected choice is possessed by both minors and adults, since
both groups fall within the class of "natural persons" under the
85. "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges,
or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens." OR. CONST. art. I, § 20.
86. Planned Parenthood, 63 Or. App. at 62, 663 P.2d at 1259-61.
87. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
88. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
89. T. W., 551 So. 2d at 1192.
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involved constitutional provision. Turning to the asserted governmental interests, the court, which earlier in its opinion had brushed
Webster aside in a single sentence, essentially adopted Roe as the law
of Florida. Thus, the health of the mother was found not to become
a compelling state interest until at least the close of the first trimester.
The state's other important interest, the potentiality of life, does not
become compelling until viability-approximately at the end of the
second trimester. 90
Turning its focus to the parental consent law, the court in T. W.
agreed that the state could legitimately give weight to the protection
of an immature potential mother and to the preservation of the family
unit. Nevertheless, in order to save the funding restriction, the court
said that these considerations must be compelling under the Florida
framework. Given the fundamental nature of the right to procreative
choice, the court held that these interests did not sustain sufficient
weight. Thus, the court struck down the parental consent requirement. 91
It is important to note that not all state courts have accepted the
argument that funding restrictions are incompatible with rights secured
by state constitutions. In Fischer v. Department oj Public Welfare,92
for example, plaintiffs challenged two Pennsylvania statutes which
essentially paralleled the most restrictive version of the Hyde Amendment. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania recognized its authority under the Pennsylvania Constitution to depart from Harris and
Maher, but found those precedents persuasive and elected to follow
them. Reasoning that Roe established only a qualified right of abortion,
which need not be financially supported by the government, the court
wrote: "A woman's freedom of choice does not carry with it a
constitutional entitlement to every financial resource with which to
avail herself of the full range of protected choices. "93 The Supreme

90. [d. at 1193.
91. The court noted as well that the statute failed the "least intrusive measures"
test, in that its provision of judicial bypass of parental consent afforded the
minor neither a right to counsel nor an on-the-record hearing. [d. at 1196.
92. 85 Pa. Commw. 240, 482 A.2d 1148, aii'd, 509 Pa. 293, 502 A.2d 114 (1985).
93. [d. at 256, 482 A.2d at 1157. The court went on to hold:
[A] citizen has a constitutional right to travel but is not entitled to
travel at the public expense. One has a constitutional right to freedom
of expression but is not entitled to the use of public funds to finance
the expounding of personal views. The economic constraints on the
woman who would terminate her pregnancy are not caused by the
Commonwealth. Her financial problems exist and continue to exist
whether she elects to choose one or the other alternative. These
problems are not the consequence of any action or legislation on the
part of the Commonwealth.
[d. (citation omitted).
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Court of Pennsylvania affirmed by simply offering a series of quotations from Harris and Maher. 94

B.

Challenges to Abortion Funding Predicated on State
Constitutional Provisions

State constitutional provisions have been used to challenge state
funding of abortion.9s For example, in Starn v. State,96 a taxpayer filed
a declaratory judgment action, challenging the appropriation of state
funds for elective abortions for indigent women. The plaintiff theorized,
inter alia, that a fetus is a "person" for purposes of North Carolina's
guarantees of due process and equal protection.
The court of appeals rejected this argument and upheld the
appropriation. Noting that the Supreme Court in Roe had rejected an
analogous contention under the federal constitution, the court explored
the state's criminal laws concerning the homicide of a fetus and its
civil laws respecting the capacity of an unborn child to hold and inherit
property. In each context, the court found that North Carolina law
did not confer upon an unborn child the same legal status as after live
birth.
The court went on to note that the plaintiff's position was burdened by practical problems. For example, recognition of fetal rights
might cast doubt on the state's authority to fund any abortion, no
matter how medically necessary. Also, in the absence of state funding
for elective abortions, indigent women might nevertheless undergo the
procedure without the medical safeguards that state funding promotes.
The court thus rejected all of the appellant's challenges and upheld
the appropriation.
C.

Direct Regulation of Abortion Funding in the Text of State
Constitutions

In some states, efforts have been made to directly amend the state
constitution to restrict or prohibit abortion funding. In Colorado, the
effort to amend that state's constitution to prohibit state funding of
abortions succeeded. 97 Similarly, in Rhode Island the text of the state
94. Fischer v. Department of Public Welfare, 509 Pa. 293, 502 A.2d 114 (1985).
95. See, e.g., McKee v. County of Ramsey, 316 N.W.2d 555 (Minn.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 860 (1982).
96. 47 N.C. App. 209, 267 S.E.2d 335 (1980), a/I'd in part, rev'd in part, 302
N.C. 357,275 S.E.2d 439 (1981). For further developments in the unsuccessful
effort of Paul Starn, Jr., to challenge abortion funding in North Carolina, see
Starn v. Hunt, 66 N.C. App. 116, 310 S.E.2d 623 (1984).
97. The Colorado Constitution now provides in part:
No public funds shall be used by the State of Colorado, its agencies
or political subdivisions to payor otherwise reimburse, either directly
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constitution governs the right to and the funding of abortions. The
Rhode Island Declaration of Rights contains the phrase: "Nothing
in this section shall be construed to grant or secure any right relating
to abortion or the funding thereof. "98 Efforts to enact similar provisions have also been made in other states, but have not as yet
surmounted all of the various obstacles necessary to amend a state's
constitution. 99 As a result, it is reasonable to anticipate that for the
foreseeable future, the more frequent focus of the constitutional
battle will probably be on the established constitutional theories of
due process and equal protection.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF ANTI-ABORTION
DEMONSTRATIONS

After the question of funding, the most bitterly contested battle
in the war over abortion focuses on the efforts of anti-abortion
demonstrators to use their rights of freedom of speech and assembly
to apply pressure to women considering an abortion and the physicians willing to perform the procedure. Although on the surface the
regulation of anti-abortion demonstrations may seem to be only
or indirectly, any person, agency or facility for the performance of
any induced abortion, PROVIDED HOWEVER, that the General
Assembly, by specific bill, may authorize and appropriate funds to
be used for those medical services necessary to prevent the death of
either a pregnant woman or her unborn child under circumstances
where every reasonable effort is made to preserve the life of each.
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 50. Even this provision has not resulted in a total
prohibition of public funding for abortion in Colorado. See Urbish v. Lamm,
761 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1988).
98. R.1. CONST. art. I, § 2. Article I, § 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution reads
as follows:
All free governments are instituted for the protection, safety, and
happiness of the people. All laws, therefore, should be made for the
good of the whole; and the burdens of the state ought to be fairly
distributed among its citizens. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied equal protection of the laws. No otherwise qualified person
shall, solely by reason of race, gender or handicap be subject to
discrimination by the state, its agents or any person or entity doing
business with the state. Nothing in this section shall be construed to
grant or secure any right relating to abortion or the funding thereof.
[d. (emphasis added).
99. See, e.g., Arkansas Women's Political Caucus v. Riviere, 283 Ark. 463, 677
S.W.2d 846 (1984) (concerning a dispute over the language of the ballot title
of proposed constitutional amendment restricting abortion funding); accord
Binninger v. Paulus, 297 Or. 179, 681 P.2d 129 (1984). The lesson of these
cases is that attempts to enact such amendments will be bitterly litigated every
step of the way.
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tangentially related to the right to obtain an abortion, in actuality,
the right to obtain an abortion is often contingent upon one having
access to a facility willing to perform the procedure. And, as will be
shown, anti-abortion activists frequently attempt and are often successful in making access to abortion facilities difficult.
In numerous cases, the clash between demonstrators and clinics
or physicians performing abortions have been resolved in the appellate
courts. Typically, the question is how far the demonstrators may
intrude upon and interfere with the normal use of private property
in the course of disseminating their message. Under state and federal
constitutions, courts have been called on to balance guarantees of
freedom of expression with the right of autonomy in the operation
of a business on private property.
The United States Supreme Court was called on to render its
opinion in Frisby v. Schultz. 1°O Frisby involved the validity, under
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, of an ordinance of the town of Brookfield, Wisconsin, which provided that it
was "unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about
the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield." 101 The genesis of this ordinance was clear. Anti-abortion
activists had begun to regularly picket on the public streets surrounding the home of a physician who performed abortions in two neighboring towns. In addition to carrying signs, the picketers shouted
slogans, warned neighborhood children to stay away from the horne
of the "baby killer," and trespassed onto the physician's property. 102
In response, the town government enacted the disputed ordinance.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, viewed the case as
involving a traditional first amendment issue, and was of the opinion
that the ordinance was a proper exercise of governmental authority.
The Court first found that streets, even in a residential neighborhood,
comprise a traditional public forum. That being the case, even a
facially content-neutral restriction on speech must permit alternative
means of communication and must be narrowly drawn to serve a
significant governmental interest.
The Court found numerous alternative means for the protesters
to get their message across-marches, door-to-door proselytizing, the
mails, and telephone contact were all deemed to be available substitutes. What gave the majority greater pause was the existence of a
governmental interest sufficient to overcome the restriction on speech
100. 487 u.s. 474 (1988).
101. [d. at 477.
102. [d. at 494. Ironically, these facts are supplied by the dissenters, who would
have struck down the ordinance. The majority, which found the restriction on
speech to be valid, painted a much more sedate picture of the protesters'
activities.
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imposed by the town law. This interest was ultimately found in the
protection of residential privacy. The Court concluded that an individual has a right to avoid unwanted speech in the privacy of his
home, and that the ordinance was designed to effectuate that right.
Finding the focus of the protesters on a single residence offensive,
the Court held that the ordinance properly regulated that form of
protest. 103
State courts have recently grappled with similar issues under
their own constitutions. In Chico Feminist Women's Health Center
v. Scully,I04 an abortion clinic sought an injunction preventing demonstrators from obtaining a vantage point from which they could
observe prospective patients of the clinic closely enough to identify
them. This request developed as a result of the demonstrators informing relatives of prospective patients that a member of their
family was contemplating an abortion, thus generating pressure on
the potential mother to abandon her plans. The clinic relied on the
right to privacy secured by the California Constitution as construed
in Myers. lOS
The Supreme Court of California in Scully held that the clinic
was not entitled to the requested relief. It reasoned that a privacy
right only existed if the clinic's clients could reasonably expect privacy
in light of the common habits of the community. A significant
possibility of being recognized on the street is simply part of life in
a small town. I06 The court went on to note that even if a limited

103. [d. at 482-88. A further irony in Frisby (or perhaps evidence of doctrinal
consistency and intellectual honesty) is that the majority was primarily comprised of abortion opponents (O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy, who
were joined by Blackmun) while the dissenters Brennan, Marshall and Stevensall adherents to Roe-found that first amendment principles favored the antiabortion protesters.
104. 208 Cal. App. 3d 230, 256 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1989).
105. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
106. The Scully court pointed out the following:
The very "small-town" characteristics that prompted the Center to
request its injunctive relief are the very characteristics that make the
relief inappropriate. Because Chico is a small city, the clients are more
likely to be recognized. But that increased chance of recognition on
a public street is a "common habit" of Chico. We have no doubt
that Chico's smaller size makes it a most attractive place to live in
many respects. But the clients who are residents of Chico must accept
the limitations of small-city life along with its amenities. One of those
limitations is a greater chance of recognition in public places by other
citizens. Having chosen to live in the environment of a small city, the
residents of Chico cannot expect the courts, by way of injunctive
relief, to guarantee them the kind of anonymity they might find in a
"large metropolitan community" such as New York City. We are
confident that, judged by the "common habits" of Chico as described
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privacy interest could exist on the public streets surrounding an
abortion clinic, additional considerations nevertheless militated against
the requested relief. Central to the court's reasoning was the protection of the demonstrators' right to freedom of speech. Citing Frisby
and other authorities, the court held that picketing was the only
effective way for the protesters to get their message across-no
reasonable alternative existed. Therefore, the requested injunctive
relief was not appropriate.
In other cases, private property rights have prevailed. For example, in Brown v. Davis,107 the Superior Court of New Jersey held
that private citizens may not "enter upon the common areas of a
multi-business office complex to espouse an anti-abortion thesis directed to prospective patients of one of the tenants without the
consent of the landlord-owner." lOS
In Brown, a landowner had erected three multiple-tenant structures on a two-acre plot. In one of those buildings, the defendant
clinic offered a range of gynecological services, including abortions.
The plaintiffs were anti-abortion protesters who carried placards
espousing a right-to-life theme. Standing forty-five to one hundred
feet from the building, the plaintiffs called or shouted to patients in
an effort to dissuade them from obtaining an abortion. Not wishing
to limit their picketing to public streets, the plaintiffs filed suit to
establish their right to enter the sidewalks and parking lots adjacent
to the building housing the clinic. Among their goals was to confront
prospective patients on a one-to-one basis. 109
The plaintiff protesters relied on both the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution and a similar provision in the New
Jersey Constitution. 110 The superior court found it necessary to
address both claims. With respect to the first amendment claim, the
court reasoned that a protester's right to enter upon private property
is measured by the extent to which that property is devoted to public
use. Here, the court found no such dedication, and therefore, rejected
the federal constitutional claim.

107.

108.
109.
110.

by the Center's own administrator, the clients had no reasonable
expectation of anonymity on Chico's public' sidewalks and streets
between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. on Saturdays.
Scully, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 242, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
203 N.J. Super. 41, 495 A.2d 900 (1984). For subsequent litigation arising out
of the same dispute; with the same result, see State v. Brown, 212 N.J. Super.
61, 513 A.2d 974, cert. denied, 107 N.J. 53, 526 A.2d 140 (1986).
Brown, 203 N.J. Super. at 45, 495 A.2d at 902.
[d.
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed
to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press .... " N.J. CONST.
art. I, § 6.
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The court in Brown next turned to the state constitution, and
began its analysis by noting that "[t]he New Jersey State Constitution
has been interpreted more broadly than the Federal Constitution to
permit the exercise of expressional rights on private property in
certain circumstances. "111 In support of this premise, the superior
court relied on the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in State
v. Schmid. ll2 In that case, the court had developed a three-pronged
test designed to strike a fair balance between expressional rights and
the security of private property. The relevant criteria were held to
be: (1) the normal use and purpose of the property involved; (2) the
extent and nature of the public's invitation to use the property; and
(3) the relationship between the purpose of the expressional activity
and the use of the property. In addition, the supreme court in Schmid
had found it relevant whether or not alternative means existed for
the desired dissemination of views. ll3
Applying these criteria, the court in Brown had no difficulty in
ruling against the protesters. Central to the court's reasoning was
the essentially private nature of the operation of the clinic. Unlike a
shopping center, it provided no facilities for the gathering of the
general public. Its "invitation" to the community at-large took the
form of advertisement of specific services for those who needed
them; not an offering of any service to the public at-large. Finally,
the expressional activity was incompatible with many services of the
clinic which had nothing to do with abortion-the facility was forced
to provide escorts for its patients to guide them through the protesters, even if the patients sought general gynecological care unrelated
to an abortion.1I4 On the basis of this reasoning, the court in Brown
ruled that the protesters had no right to enter upon the property of
the defendants.
A year after Brown was decided, a separate panel of the Superior
Court of New Jersey reviewed Planned Parenthood of Monmouth
County, Inc. v. Cannizzaro. liS There, Planned Parenthood, which
offered gynecological services including first trimester abortions, filed
suit to enjoin picketers from trespassing upon its property. The
defendants had picketed the property for years, shouting a variety
of insults including comparison of the clinic's operators to concentration camp personnel and murderers. On one occasion, the defendants entered the building, engaged in a "shoving match," and were
forcibly ejected. 1I6
111. Brown, 203 N.J. Super. at 46, 495 A.2d at 903.
112. 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton Univ.
v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982).
113. [d. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630.
114. Brown, 203 N.J. Super. at 46-48, 495 A.2d at 903-04.
115. 204 N.J. Super. 531, 499 A.2d 535 (1985).
116. [d. at 535, 499 A.2d at 537.
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The court analyzed under the state constitution the competing
contentions that the plaintiffs operated a private enterprise, and that
the defendants possessed a right of freedom of expression. The
defendants also asserted that, as a recipient of public funds, Planned
Parenthood was not truly operating a private concern.
The Cannizzaro court applied a "sliding scale" rule-the greater
the devotion of the picketed entity to a public use, the greater its
obligation to accommodate expressional activity.117 In finding that
the clinic was essentially private despite its acceptance of public
funds, the court quoted extensively from Byrne,118 and reasoned that
it is difficult to imagine an activity more private than the gynecological services rendered by the plaintiffs. The court also found that the
tactics of the picketers went beyond mere speech and had been
properly categorized by the trial court as "intimidating and harassing" conduct. 119 The court in Cannizzaro thus affirmed the injunctive
relief granted by the trial court which barred the picketers from the
clinic property and limited them to nonobstructive activity on the
surrounding public sidewalks.
The reasoning of these New Jersey cases was followed by the
Supreme Court of Delaware in State v. ElliottYo In Elliott, defendants challenged their convictions for criminal trespass arising out
of an anti-abortion demonstration on the grounds of the Delaware
Women's Health Organization. The demonstrators had insisted on
entering the property of the clinic, which provided a range of
gynecological services including abortions, even though they were
able to get the same message across from the grounds of a neighboring grocery store. As in Brown, the demonstrators shouted epithets
that the clinic's physician was a murderer. This created an atmosphere
characterized by the court as "volatile." 121
Applying both the Delaware and United States constitutions, the
court held that the defendants' convictions did not contravene their
right of freedom of assembly. In so holding, the court found persuasive and applied the analysis of the New Jersey cases cited above.
The court emphasized the fact that the clinic was private, with no
dedication to public use. The clinic had been housed in a single
structure set apart from others, with no general invitation for the
public to use its facjlities. Finally, the expressional activity of the
demonstrators interfered with services unrelated to abortion. Weigh-

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

[d. at 538, 499 A.2d at 538.
See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
Cannizzaro, 204 N.J. Super. at 543, 499 A.2d at 542.
548 A.2d 28 (Del. 1988).
[d. at 31.
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ing these factors, the court found no constitutional obstacle to the
defendants' convictions. 122
In each of these cases the appellate court held that anti-abortion
demonstrators are free to picket along public streets and roads
surrounding an abortion clinic to express their disapproval of abortions. Anti-abortion protesters may not, however, come onto the
property of the clinic itself to harass and intimidate prospective
patients. This is particularly true if the clinic provides services other
than abortions, or if an alternative method is available for the
protesters to convey their message.

v.

THE LAW OF ABORTION IN MARYLAND

In the 1991 legislative session, the Maryland General Assembly
significantly changed the state's statutes concerning abortion. Prior
to July 1, 1991, section 20-208 of the Health-General article of the
Maryland Code forbade the performance of any abortion except
where the abortion is performed before the twenty-seventh week of
gestation l23 in an accredited hospital by a licensed physician and: (1)
the pregnancy would likely result in the death of the mother; (2)
there is a substantial risk that the pregnancy would impair the physical
or mental health of the mother; (3) there is a substantial risk that
the child will have "grave permanent physical deformity or mental
retardation;" or (4) the pregnancy resulted from rape. l2A In addition,
a hospital abortion review committee must authorize in writing the
performance of each abortion and must "keep written records of all
requests for authorization and its action thereon." 125

122. [d. at 32-33. A similar scenario was before the Court of Criminal Appeals in
Crabb v. State, 754 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 815 (1989). In Crabb, trespass convictions were returned when demonstrators entered the lobby of an abortion clinic, pounding the walls and shouting
"abortion is murder" in defiance of a police officer's order that they leave.
Defendants were placed on probation, one condition of which was that they
stay away from the clinic. Among the many contentions relied on by the
defendants was an assertion that this condition violated the United States and
Texas Constitutions in various respects. The court responded that a curtailment
of constitutional rights is valid if tailored to the circumstances of a particular
crime. Here, the restriction on the defendants' freedom was limited, protected
the victim, and reduced the likelihood that the conditions of probation would
be violated. It was therefore upheld.
123. The "[n]ot more than twenty-six weeks of gestation" requirement does not
apply in the case where the fetus is dead or where the pregnancy would likely
result in the death of the potential mother. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §
20-208(b)(l) (1990).
124. [d. § 20-208(a)-(b).
125. [d. § 20-208(b)(2)-(c).
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Two opiruons of the Maryland Attorney GeneraJ126 and a case
decided by the court of special appeals l27 have all held section 20208 to be unconstitutional in light of Roe and its progeny.128 Earlier
this year, the General Assembly decided to repeal sections 20-201 to
-206, -208, -210, and -211 of the Health-General article and replace
those provisions with a much less restrictive scheme. Therefore, as
of July 1, 1991, most of Maryland's abortion statutes were replaced
by much different provisions. 129
126. See 70 Op. Att'y Gen. 3 (1985); 62 Op. Att'y Gen. 3 (1977).
127. See Coleman v. Coleman, 57 Md. App. 755,471 A.2d 1115 (1984).
128. For example, in Coleman, the court said in dicta:
Any reading of Health-General Art. § 20-208(a) discloses that it
conflicts with the decisions of the Supreme Court in Doe v. Boiton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973), as well as Roe v. Wade and City oj Akron in
that the Maryland statute fails to delineate between terminating the
pregnancy during the first trimester and any subsequent time. Because
of that failure, Health-General Art. § 20-208(a) is unconstitutional
insofar as it conflicts with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Id. at 760, 471 A.2d at 1118 (citations omitted).
129. See Act of Feb. 18, 1991, ch. 1, 1991 Md. Laws 5. The preamble to this law
reads as follows:
AN ACT concerning Abortion
FOR the purpose of revising certain statutory provisions relating
to abortion; authorizing a physician to perform an abortion on an
unmarried minor without notice to a parent or guardian of the minor
if, in the professional judgment of the physician, the minor is mature
and capable of giving informed consent or notice would not be in the
best interest of the minor; prohibiting a physician from giving notice
to a parent or guardian if the minor decides not to have the abortion;
repealing a certain provision of law related to certain information that
must be provided prior to an abortion; repealing certain provisions
of law related to abortion referral services; clarifying a provision of
law related to referral services; requiring that an abortion be performed
by a licensed physician; providing that the State may not interfere
with the decision of a woman to terminate a pregnancy if certain
conditions exist and under certain circumstances; specifying that the
State may not interfere with a woman's decision to terminate a
pregnancy at any time if certain circumstances exist; providing a
certain immunity for a physician under certain circumstances; authorizing the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to adopt certain
regulations related to the termination of a human pregnancy; repealing
a provision of law related to the imposition of certain penalties against
certain persons who violate certain provisions of law related to the
termination of a human pregnancy; repealing a provision of law related
to certain disciplinary actions against a licensed physician for performing an abortion outside a licensed hospital; defining certain terms;
making provisions of this Act severable; specifying that if a certain
provision of this Act is petitioned to referendum and rejected by the
voters, such rejection does not affect other provisions of the Act
unless the other provisions are also petitioned to referendum and
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The new section 20-208 simply requires that an abortion be
performed by a licensed physician. 130 The new section 20-209 codifies
the Supreme Court's holding in Roe.l3l The state may not interfere
with the potential mother's right to choose before the fetus is viable.
Viability is defined under section 20-209(a) as "that stage when, in
the best medical judgment of the attending physician based on the
particular facts of the case before the physician, there is a reasonable
likelihood of the fetus's sustained survival outside of the womb."132
Even after viability, the state may not interfere with a woman's right
to terminate the pregnancy if (l) the abortion is necessary to protect
the life or health of the woman, or (2) the fetus has a genetic defect,
or a serious deformity or abnormality.133
The new section 20-209 also authorizes the Maryland Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene to adopt regulations which are necessary and "least intrusive" to protect the health and life of the
potential mother, and which are consistent with established medical
practices. Finally, the new section 20-209 grants immunity from civil
liability or criminal penalties to physicians who perform abortions in
accordance with section 20-209, so long as the decision to perform
the abortion is made in good faith, in the "physician's best medical

rejected by the voters; and generally relating to abortion.
[d. at 5.
130. [d. at 8 (to be codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-208).
131. [d. at 9 (to be codified at MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-209). The new
§ 20-209 will read as follows:
(a) In this section, "viable" means that stage when, in the best
medical judgment of the attending physician based on the particular
facts of the case before the physician, there is a reasonable likelihood
of the fetus's sustained survival outside the womb.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the state may
not interfere with the decision of a woman to terminate a pregnancy:
(1) Before the fetus is viable; or
(2) At any time during the woman's pregnancy, if: (i) The
termination procedure is necessary to protect the life or health of the
woman; or (ii) The fetus is affected by genetic defect or serious
deformity or abnormality.
(c) The Department may adopt regulations that:
(1) Are both necessary and the least intrusive method to
protect the life or health of the woman; and
(2) Are not inconsistent with established medical practice.
(d) The physician is not liable for civil damages or subject to a
criminal penalty for a decision to perform an abortion under this
section made in good faith and in the physician's best medical judgment in accordance with accepted standards of medical practice.

[d.
132. [d.
133. [d.
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judgment," and "in accordance with accepted standards of medical
practice. "134
The 1991 General Assembly also modified the parental notification requirement for minors who seek abortions. Under the prior
version of section 20-103 of the Health-General article, a physician
generally cannot perform an abortion on an unmarried minor unless
the physician first notifies the minor's parent or guardian. 135 There
were formerly two exceptions to this general rule. First, a physician
may perform an abortion on an unmarried minor if the minor does
not live with a parent or guardian, and a "reasonable effort" to
give notice is unsuccessful. 136 Second, a physician can perform such
an abortion "if, in the professional judgment of the physician, notice
to the parent or guardian may lead to physical or emotional abuse
of the minor."137
Under the newly adopted version of section 20-103, the general
rule and the current exceptions have remained the same, however,
two additional exceptions have been added. 138 Under the new section
20-103, a physician can perform an abortion on a minor without
notice to the minor's parent or guardian if, in the professional
judgment of the physician, (1) "[t]he minor is mature and capable
of giving informed consent to an abortion," or (2) "[n]otification
would not be in the best interest of the minor." 139
Although the Maryland courts have not had the occasion to
consider whether funding for abortions for the poor is protected by
the Constitution, the court of appeals has held that a broadly worded
statute required funding for abortions. In Kindley v. Governor of
Maryland,l40 the court considered whether and to what extent a state
134. [d.
135. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103(a) (1990) ("Except as provided in
subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a physician may not perform an abortion
on an unmarried minor unless the physician first gives notice to a parent or
guardian of the minor.").
136. [d. § 20-103(b).
137. [d. § 20-103(c).
13S. See Act of Feb. IS, 1991, ch. 1, 1991 Md. Laws 6-7 (to be codified as MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103(c». The new § 20-103(c) reads as follows:
(1) The physician may perform the abortion, without notice to a
parent or guardian of a minor if, in the professional judgment of the
physician: (i) Notice to the parent or guardian may lead to physical
or emotional abuse of the minor; (ii) The minor is mature and capable
of giving informed consent to an abortion; or (iii) Notification would
not be in the best interest of the minor.
(2) The physician is not liable for civil damages or subject to a
criminal penalty for a decision under this subsection not to give notice.

[d.
139. [d. § 20-103(c)(1)(ii)-(iii).
140. 289 Md. 620, 426 A.2d 908 (1981).
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statute, which simply required the Secretary of Health and Mental
Hygiene to "administer a program of comprehensive medical and
other care in the State for indigent and medically indigent persons, "141
authorized the appropriation of public funds for abortions.142
The appellants, a group of residents and taxpayers seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent state funding of abortions,143 argued first that the term "comprehensive medical and other
care" could not be read to include "nontherapeutic abortions." 144
Second, the appellants argued that at the time of the enactment of
the statute nearly all abortions were illegal. 145
The court of appeals in Kindley found no merit in either of the
appellants' arguments. The court held that since the statute was
phrased in broad and general terms, the statute was "designed to
permit indigent persons to receive the advantages of whatever health
care may be presently accepted as appropriate in the medical community. "146 The court found that the statute was enacted to "alleviate
some of the hardships of poverty by providing medical care to those
who could not afford it, "147 and that "an abortion is certainly one
of the medical alternatives for dealing with pregnancy. "148 The court
of appeals went on to point out that even in light of Harris v.
McRae, federal and state governments were still free to fund abortions, including nontherapeutic abortions. 149 However, the court clearly
indicated that nothing in the decision suggested that the State of
Maryland was constitutionally required to fund any abortions. 150
The Kindley decision indicates that the court of appeals would
not be willing to read a "comprehensive medical" statute to exclude
abortion funding for indigent women. The decision also indicates
that the court of appeals would prefer that the General Assembly
legislate on the controversial issue of abortion rather than the court
141. MD. CODE ANN. art. 43, § 42(a)(l) (1980).
142. Kindley, 289 Md. at 623, 426 A.2d at 910.
143. [d. at 622, 426 A.2d at 910.
144. !d. at 623, 426 A.2d at 911.
145. [d. at 624, 426 A.2d at 911 ("At the time of the 1967 amendments to § 42,
any abortion, even by a licensed physician, was a criminal offense, except
where the fetus was dead or the physician, after consultation with one or more
physicians, was 'satisfied ... that no other method [would] secure the safety
of the mother.' ")
146. [d. The Kindley court added: "Where, as here, a statute is phrased in broad
general terms, it suggests that the legislature intended the provision to be
capable of encompassing circumstances and situations which did not exist at
the time of the enactment." [d. at 625, 426 A.2d at 911.
147. [d. at 626, 426 A.2d at 912.
148. [d. at 628, 426 A.2d at 913.
149. [d. at 629, 426 A.2d at 914.
150. [d. at 630, 426 A.2d at 914 ("the General Assembly is free to limit the conditions under which public funds may be expended for abortions").
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having to decide whether the Maryland Constitution contains rights
relating to abortion. The General Assembly has done just that in the
most recent legislative session. Now, regardless of whether the Supreme Court overrules Roe in a future case, the holding of Roe will
be the law in Maryland unless or until the General Assembly decides
otherwise.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services indicates that Roe v. Wade may be either overruled or
further substantially modified in the very near future. State courts
and legislative bodies have responded to the Supreme Court's holdings
in Harris v. McRae and Webster in various ways. Some states have
held that indigent women have the right under their state constitution
to receive funds for an abortion. Other states have held that their
state constitutions provide no such guarantees. In some states, most
recently in Florida, the courts have determined that under their state
constitution, a woman has the right to determine whether to terminate
or carry a pregnancy to term. In other states, such as Maryland, the
state's legislative branch has statutorily established a woman's right
to choose. Though the state courts and legislative bodies have varied
greatly in their holdings and statutes, one thing remains clear-if
Roe is overruled, the state legislative and judicial battles are bound
to intensify.

